## Archive for the ‘**Uncategorized**’ Category

## DFLY: syscall frequency

What does the syscall traffic look like for a “make buildkernel”?

% ktrace -di -f /home/dion/projects/syscall-hist/trace1.ktlog -t c make buildkernel

% ktrace -di -f /home/dion/projects/syscall-hist/trace2-cw.ktlog -t cw make buildkernel

Then, I used this “thing” to chew the log files and spit out a nicer form. This code is pretty loosely based on the source to kdump.

#include #include #include #include #include #include static void process_ktrace_log(FILE *logf); uint64_t syscalls[512] = { 0 }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { FILE *logf; logf = fopen(argv[1], "r"); process_ktrace_log(logf); fclose(logf); return 0; } static void process_ktrace_log(FILE *logf) { struct ktr_header ktrhdr; struct timeval tv_curr, tv_first, *tvp_first = NULL; int ktrlen; char *m = NULL; int m_size = 0; FILE *logsc = fopen("sc.log", "w"); FILE *logcsw = fopen("csw.log", "w"); while (fread(&ktrhdr, sizeof(struct ktr_header), 1, logf) == 1) { if ((ktrlen = ktrhdr.ktr_len) m_size) { m = (void *)realloc(m, ktrlen+1); if (m == NULL) errx(1, "%s", strerror(ENOMEM)); m_size = ktrlen; } if (ktrlen && fread(m, ktrlen, 1, logf) == 0) errx(1, "data too short"); if (!tvp_first) { tv_first = ktrhdr.ktr_time; tvp_first = &tv_first; } timersub(&ktrhdr.ktr_time, tvp_first, &tv_curr); switch (ktrhdr.ktr_type) { case KTR_SYSCALL: { struct ktr_syscall *ktrsc = (struct ktr_syscall *)m; fprintf(logsc, "%16lld %d\n", (uint64_t) tv_curr.tv_sec * 1000000L + tv_curr.tv_usec, ktrsc->ktr_code); syscalls[ktrsc->ktr_code]++; } break; case KTR_CSW: { struct ktr_csw *ktrcsw = (struct ktr_csw *)m; } break; default: break; } } fclose(logsc); fclose(logcsw); { FILE *schistlog = fopen("schist.log", "w"); int i; for(i = 0; i < 512; i++) { if (syscalls[i]) fprintf(schistlog, "%d %lld\n", i, syscalls[i]); } fclose(schistlog); } }

Then I used this gnuplot input to generate a quick plot:

set terminal png set output 'schist-1m.png' set xrange [0:60000000] plot "sc.log" using 1:2 with dots

Finally, I used this little python script (I’m guessing some awk/sed genius could do it on the command line, but I can’t):

#!/usr/pkg/bin/python2.4 import sys import re sc = open("/usr/include/sys/syscall.h") scdict = {} for line in sc.readlines(): mo = re.match("^#define\s+SYS_(\S+)\s+(\d+)\s*$", line) if mo is not None: scdict[mo.group(2)] = mo.group(1) sc.close() dpair_re = re.compile("^\s*(\d+) (\d+)$") for line in sys.stdin.readlines(): mo = dpair_re.match(line) if mo is not None: print '%15s %3s %s' % (mo.group(2), mo.group(1), scdict[mo.group(1)])

Then I sorted it on the command line:

% ./schist.py schist-chew.log

And the top 15 are: (full results)

1047837 197 mmap 828677 5 open 412613 3 read 355321 6 close 343725 476 fstat 287935 73 munmap 278365 475 stat 114136 4 write 108059 342 sigaction 88929 199 lseek 64747 477 lstat 42090 92 fcntl 40985 472 set_tls_area 29434 253 issetugid 27946 59 execve

[EDIT] Added the graph and final results.

## [SHA, Right] What's Joux Talkin' Bout?

"Differential Collisions in SHA-0" Chabaud & Joux begin by attacking a weakened SHA-0 variation. The first version, which they call SHI1, is equivalent to SHA-0 with the addition operations in A_{i+1} replaced with XORs and the f_i functions replaced by XOR. This effectively removes the non-linearity introduced by the f_i function and the addition operations. The analysis of SHI1 begins by examing the effect of perturbations of the vector W_{i} (0 <= i < 80) directly (instead of trying to study the perturbations of the message block, M or W_i (0 <= i = 75 "since a perturbation in round i is never corrected before round i + 6, and since all perturbations must be corrected by round 80." The intuitive explanation of the process ---------------------------------------- Important observation: * The expansion process does not interleave bits! This turns it into a function from 16 bits to 80 bits over each bit in the word. 1. Find valid perturbations -- these are deduced by ensuring they fit the expansion recurrence relation. It is important to see that since the compression functions starts primed with some A - E, the recurrence must actually start at the 11th word (5 steps [A-E] behind the 16th that the recurrence is defined at). The search is brute force with a search space of 2^16. It is simple. We will call the chosen error vector e_{0} TODO: Include the functions taken from sha_exp_rev.py that compute valid error vectors. 2. Now, derive the global differential mask (which is M in the paper -- M is also the message block... bad naming). The global differential mask is derived by fixing the flips found in the previous step with the differential path described in the prebvious section. Since the SHI1 defines all combination function in the compression function as XOR, we can XOR the differential paths for all the bits flipped in e_{0} to compute up with the global mask. We will call the global mask G. We only need the first 16 words of this mask since those will define the rest of it (via the expansion function). NOTE: Maybe worth pointing out that this will generate a valid W' because e_{0} satisfies (9). 3. Given the global mask M and *any* input message M, SHI1(M) == SHI1(M \xor G). Collision! Hooray! Wait. That's just SHI1. It's all linear. We just solved an algebra equation. Oh.

## [SHA, Right] The Algorithm

## SHA-0 (or something more clever here)

SHA-0 was specified in the first Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (current draft) issued in 1993. Two years later, NIST issued a small change to the SHA-0 expansion function; the new function is known as SHA-1. There was no justification for the updated function, but it is assumed the NSA found a collision attack.

### Structure of the Hash Function

The SHA hash function works on blocks of 512 bits and outputs a hash value of 160 bits. The function proceeds as follows:

- Pad the message by adding a single 1 bit and then a string of 0 bits suffixed with the length (
**in bits**) of the message without padding (represented as a 64-bit big endian integer). The number of zero bits is chosen as the minimum number to evenly pad the message to the next 512 bit boundary. - The five state variables are initialized to fixed constants:
A = 0x67452301 B = 0xefcdab89 C = 0x98badcfe D = 0x10325476 E = 0xc3d2e1f0

- For each message block, call the compression function using the current state, A through E, and the current block. The compression function will return the new state. Pseudocode:
state[i + 1] = compress(current_block, state[i])

- The output of the function is the concatentation of the state variables. Pseudocode:
return A ++ B ++ C ++ D ++ E

### The Compression Function

The compression function is where all the “good stuff” happens.

is computed as:

- Divide the 512-bit message block, M, into 16 32-bit words .
- Expand the 16 words into 80 words using the expansion function defined by the recurrence relation:

- Initialize the state variables, , using
- For each word in W, , compute the new state as:

The function is defined below. - The output is given as:

The function "f_i(X,Y,Z)" and "K_i" are defined as: If i is in the range: [ 0, 20) "IF" f_i = (X & Y) | (X & Z) K_i = 0x5A827999 [20, 39) "XOR" f_i = X ^ Y ^ Z K_i = 0x6ED9EBA1 [40, 59) "MAJ" f_i = (X & Y) | (X & Z) | (Y & Z) K_i = 0x8F1BBCDC [60, 79) "XOR" f_i = X ^ Y ^ Z K_i = 0xCA62C1D6 NOTE: Add a link to the python implementation.

## [SHA, Right] Introduction: A French Guy, an Israeli Guy, and a Chinese Gal Walk into a Bar

… and discuss how best to attack SHA.

I was talking with a math guy here about the requirement for SHA-384 in a product we are developing. I had heard that MD5 was “insecure” and not to be trusted for collision resistance, but I hadn’t heard anything about SHA-1. Despite hearing these claims around the internet, I’ve never investigated further. My co-worker mentioned that SHA-1 was also on the way out and NIST will probably issue something declaring the larger members of the SHA family (SHA-384 and SHA-512) to be the new standards (I’ve since learned that NIST has a call for proposals for new hash functions — in the same way they picked AES). Never having implemented a *secure* hash function, I was curious what was involved and where the “one-wayed-ness” came from. This investigation led me from doing a fast implementation of SHA-512 (and, almost by default, SHA-384) to the original paper on differential attacks on DES to a bunch of work by three groups hitting the SHA functions pretty hard. I feel like I should try and explain some of the attacks I’ve learned (along with source code) — they’re clever and not difficult to understand once digested.

Before I begin, here are some references for those following along at home. I’m sorry for the crappy links; I know Springer and ACM are useless for anyone outside of academia. I’ll have to upload local copies — these papers are surprisingly hard to find.

- F. Chabaud, A. Joux. Differential Collisions in SHA-0.
- E. Biham, R. Chen. Near collisions of SHA-0.
- X. Wang, H. Yu, Y.L. Yin. Efficient collision search attacks on SHA0.
- X. Wang, H. Yu. How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions.
- X. Wang, Y.L. Yin, H. Yu. Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1.
- E. Biham, A. Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of DES-like Cryptosystems.
- The FIPS documents for SHA and DES and AES